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AI Cynically Misrepresented by Activists


Feb 10, 2017


A report in the Korea Herald dated January 5th implied that the current epornitic of H5N6 avian influenza in South Korea can be attributed to intensive production of eggs. While it is recognized that infection of a large in-line unit results in a magnitude of financial loss greater than a small farm, there is no difference in susceptibility of flocks or individual birds to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus attributed to size or scope of operation.  The Korea Herald article authored by Kim Da-sol incorrectly states “experts say that poor breeding conditions at poultry farms such as industrial-scale farming of egg-laying hens may have accelerated the spread of avian influenza virus.”


It is acknowledged that an infected flock will excrete virus and theoretically the larger the number of birds infected the greater will be the multiplication and dissemination of infective particles in the immediate area of a farm. This is the basis of the accepted control measure to deplete a flock exposed to HPAI within 24 hours of a presumptive diagnosis. Outbreaks of avian influenza are essentially a function of defective biosecurity which permits transmission of virus from infected to susceptible flocks. Routes can include common feed mills supplying many farms under diverse management, egg packing plants drawing from numerous locations with interchange of contaminated transport material, processing plants serving a wide area and by infected clothing of personnel, vehicles and equipment. Aerogenous spread is possible but is usually confined to intra-farm transmission or among farms in close proximity.

The fact that the 2016/2017 outbreak in South Korea is a repeat of the previous epornitic in 2014, both introduced by migratory waterfowl, suggests that defects in biosecurity were not identified and resolved following control and eradication three years ago.  In contrast, both Structural and Operational biosecurity have been intensified in the U.S. following investigations defining the epidemiology of the extensive outbreak. Guidance has been provided by poultry health professionals in academia, Federal and state extension service and veterinarians employed by companies producing eggs.

A very suggestive comment in the Korea Herald article states “hens spend their entire lives on a sheet of A4-paper sized cage with dust, ammonia, gas and stink.” This statement is taken directly from propaganda circulated by the Humane Society of the United States.  It is interesting that A4 paper is not used in Korea. The tone of the article and comments clearly suggest either

 collusion and collaboration with the HSUS or plagiarism of their literature. Either way correlating housing systems with susceptibility to HPAI represents a cynical distortion of facts relating to a disease outbreak in an attempt to advance the HSUS agenda favoring a vegan lifestyle and opposition to intensive production of protein food.

When the 2015 outbreak of HPAI moved from turkey grow-out farms in Minnesota to large in-line shell egg and breaking units in Iowa during April and May of 2015, Michael Greger MD, affiliated to the HSUS as Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture, disparaged the U.S. egg production industry with falsehoods and half-truths stating “the poultry industry looks for easy scapegoats such as wild ducks and geese even though these animals have flown over North America for millennia.”  Dr. Greger is the author of Bird flu: A Virus of our Own Hatching, sponsored and circulated by the HSUS.  It is clear that each time a disease outbreak involving livestock occurs, the HSUS and its affiliates and disciples attempt to advance their cause by oversimplification at best and distortion and misinformation at the other end of the scale.

For the benefit of the HSUS and its supporters it is a matter of record that current H5N8 avian influenza outbreaks involving virtually all nations in the EU in addition to Turkey, Israel and Iran, have mostly occurred on backyard and small commercial farms.  The most extreme situation is in France where the infection occurs in free-range geese and ducks with over 80 individual outbreaks recorded. In desperation authorities have belatedly imposed quarantines in areas with predominantly family-operated farms. The control measures now involve preemptive depletion of healthy non-confined flocks to prevent contact between migratory birds and waterfowl maintained for foie gras production.

It is an inescapable fact that migratory birds are now carrying recombinant strains of avian influenza incorporating genes from both commercial poultry and free-living birds.  This is an evolutionary reality and will be faced seasonally for years to come. Introduction of HPAI onto a farm has nothing to do with cage size, farm capacity, stocking density, genetics or housing system. The probability of a farm being infected relates directly to the introduction of virus by migratory birds coupled with deficiencies in Conceptual, Structural or Operational biosecurity.

The only saving grace is that humans are not susceptible to either the H5N8 strain in the EU or the H5N6 strain prevalent in Korea and Japan.